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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1

NATURE OF THE CASE
This controversy arises out of competing claims upon an automobile dealer licensing
statutory bond provided by (Appellant/Defendant) Western Surety to Best of the Best Auto
Sales Inc, pursuant to Idaho Code 49-1608 and 49-1610.
An auto auction claim on the bond for a dishonored check and one for a dishonored
check plus additional damage were sent directly to Western Surety for payment. The checks
were for vehicles Best of the Best purchased. The claims were initially denied, and then
the auctions withheld vehicle titles from bona fide purchasers.

Eventually they were paid by

W estem Surety in the total amount of the bond - $20,000 in the summer of 2009.

(Respondent/Cross Appellant/Plaintiff) Nick Hestead purchased a 2004 Ford F 350
from Best of the Best in June 2007, but it had an undisclosed branded lemon title from
California and had problems. He filed a lawsuit and proceeded through the Court system,
finding out in August, 2009 that Western Surety had paid its bond amount to the auto auctions.
Hestead obtained a Judgment in March, 2010 and made a bond claim based upon the
Judgment and in accord with Idaho Code 49-1610(4) .. Western Surety responded that the bond
had been paid and was "exhausted".
Nick Hestead maintains the bond is not exhausted and can only be paid after obtaining
a judgment. Idaho Code 49-1610 provides a "claim" cannot even be filed with the
surety until a judgment is 30 days old.

The "process" in subdivision 4 of this statute must be

satisfied before a claim can be paid by the surety. Hestead also suggests that Western Surety
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could have filed an interpleader to exhaust the bond, and take reasonable steps to give notice
to all potential claimants since there were no judgment claimants at the time.
Western Surety maintains that the requirement of a judgment leads to absurd results,
higher costs, and a waiting period. They contend a key sentence in Idaho Code 41-1839 (3)
makes Western Surety an "involuntary" payor so long as Western Surety acts in good faith in
paying any "claim" presented to it, whether that "claim" complies with Idaho Code 49-1610
or not
Nick Hestead counters that there is no constitutional, common law or other legal duty
for the Legislature to require a bond; the requirement of a judgment is found in many
automobile dealer bond statutes throughout the United States; Western Surety is well aware of
this requirement, several state courts have required the judgment "process" in their
automobile dealer bond statutes to be followed; and "involuntary" means Western Surety can
recover improper payments from payees, indemnitors, and subrogees, providing it acts in
good faith.
The Honorable Susan Wiebe found that Idaho Code 49-1610 is a specific statute
applicable to this controversy, mentioned the word "judgment" at least four times, and must
be followed. She said Western Surety acted in good faith, but did not comply with the statute.
She awarded $12,500 in damages.
Nick Hestead asks that the Summary Judgment be affirmed and in a cross appeal
asks that the Supreme Court find that the sales tax and interest paid by Hestead to the lender
are "damage or loss" covered by the bond.
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Both parties ask for attorneys fees under Idaho Code 41-1839.

2.
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
Nick Hestead agrees with the Course of Proceedings discussion in Appellants Brief,
except for the statement on Page 16 that "The Motions were heard on December 10, 2010.
Tr. Vol 1)". Only Nick Hesteads Motion for Summary Judgment and Western Surety's
Motion to Strike two affidavits for consideration were heard on that date. Western Surety's
Motion for Summary Judgment was to be heard on December 30, 2010. (Tr Vol 1 P 4 L 1722).

3.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
A
NICK HESTEAD BOUGHT A TRUCK WHICH WAS AN
UNDISCLOSED BRANDED LEMON FROM BEST OF THE
BEST AND OBTAINED A JUDGMENT

CNA Surety dba Western Surety writes surety bonds under automobile dealer licensing
statutes. It apparently writes them throughout the United States as it has been a party to many
reported cases.
Western Surety has been writing automobile surety bonds for at least 10 years in Idaho
and is fully aware of the requirements of Idaho Code 49-1610. In a letter dated February 18,
2000 to an attorney for a used car dealer, Western Surety Assistant Vice President Michael
Dow, stated "Subsection (4) of Section 49--1610 of the Idaho Code provides for recovery
under the bond as follows:" and then quotes verbatim Subsection (4). (R. Vol 1 p 32-33)
During the year 2007 Western Surety provided a $20,000 bond pursuant to Idaho Code
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49-1610 on behalf of Best of the Best Auto Sales Inc. (R. Vol 1 p 17- Statement of
Uncontested Facts; R. Vol 1 p 10 - Answer) .
On or about June 7, 2007, Nick Hestead entered into an agreement to purchase a Ford
F350 from Best of the Best Auto Sales Inc (R. Vol 1 p 99, 108). He financed the purchase
through his credit union and is still repaying the loan. (R.Vol 1 p 101 - Dep Hestead P 12 L
10-11). The truck subsequently turned out to be a branded lemon, with many problems in the
past and even had problems just three weeks before Nick Hesteads deposition on October 19,
2010. (R. Vol 1 p 101- Dep Hestead P 12 L 19-25; P 13 L 1-5). When Nick Hestead decided
to get rid of the vehicle he went to Dan Wiebold and learned the vehicle was worth much less
than he thought because of the lemon brand. (R.Vol l p 102 - Dep Hestead P 19 L 12-25).
On September 2, 2008, a lawsuit was filed against Ron Zechman dba Best of the Best
Auto Sales. (R. Vol 1 p 106 - Dep Hestead 34 L 11-13).

The lawsuit alleged Best of the

Best sold the F 350 Ford Truck to Morgan Creek Homes on December 18, 2006. disclosing
the Lemon Law Buy Back, but Best of the Best did not disclose this fact to Nick Hestead when
he bought the truck a year later. (R.Vol 1 p 110; Complaint Paragraph IX). The lawsuit
alleged this is an unfair and deceptive act and practice and violates the Idaho Consumer
Protection Act (Count II) and is a breach of express and implied warranties (Count I) (R. Vol
1 p 108 -110)
The lawsuit asked for damages consisting of the diminished value of the truck
$12,500 , the amount of the sales tax on $12,500 which is $750, and "interest Plaintiff has
paid on borrowed funds of $12,500 which he incurred in order to purchase the vehicle."
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(R.Vol l p 110 - Complaint Paragraph XI).
The lawsuit eventually went to trial and took a day. (R. Vol l p 104 - Dep Hestead P
25 L20-22). The Honorable James Morfitt entered Judgment for Nick Hestead, finding
"Defendant Best of the Best Auto Sales Inc violated Idaho
Transportation Department ID APA Regulation 39 .02.07 .400
relating to required disclosures of branded titles, the Idaho
Consumer Protection Act at Idaho Code 48-603(7), (14),
(17) and breached express and implied warranties under
the Uniform Commercial Code"
(R. Vol 1 p 29)
Judge Morfitt then awarded Nick Hestead damages of $12,500, plus interest from the
date of purchase at the rate of 10.9% on that amount which totals $3729, and sales tax damage
of $750. (R.Vol 1 p 29)

B.
TWO AUTO AUCTIONS WERE GIVEN INSUFFICIENT FUNDS CHECKS FOR
VEHICLES BEST OF THE BEST PURCHASED AND MADE DIRECT CLAIMS
ON THE WESTERN SURETY BOND

Meanwhile in 2008, a business entity wrote checks to two auto auctions that were not
honored. The auto auctions did not go to Court. Instead they directly sent demand letters
to Western Surety.
One check was from "Best of the Best Auto Sales dba Z' s Paint and Body Ron
Zechman Sr". to Brashers Idaho Auto Auction for $9,360. and dated September 19, 2008.
(R.Vol 2 p 140). Brashers sent a claim directly to Western Surety which was received by
Western Surety on November 13, 2008. (R. Vol 2 p 139) Brashers attached three invoices
dated April 24, 2008, to support its claim. (R.Vol 2 p 141-143).
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Apparently Brashsers had

extended some kind of credit to this entity from April to September.
Dealers Auction made its claim against "Principal: Ron Zechman dba Best of the
Best" in its letter of October 10, 2008. (R. Vol 2 p 133)

The letter states: "Ron Zechman

dba Best of the Best obtained vehicles from Dealers pursuant to his agreement with Dealers
with the intent to defraud Dealer's as evidenced by his continuous payment of insufficient
funds by way of check." (R. Vol 2 p 133). On December 16, 2008, Dealers sent a letter with
the same language, except it stated "Principal: Best of the Best Inc." and substituted "Ron
Zechman dba Best of the Best Auto Sales Inc". ( R.Vol II p 134)
Dealers Auto Auction was given an insufficient funds check on or about June 4, 2008,
in the amount of $8,810. (R.Vol II p 131). A summary dated September 22, 2008. and
addressed to "Ron Best of the Best", shows that 7 cars were unpaid as of that date. (R. Vol
II p 130). It appears that a 1998 Alero was acquired on February 15, 2006 and still not paid
for. (R. Vol II p 130). Thereafter Dealers apparently extended credit for purchases of 6 other
vehicles throughout 2007. (R. Vol II p 130).
The record appears to show that the purchasers of these vehicles paid for their vehicles
and were bona fide purchasers. (R. Vol II p 157 May 4, 2009 email "Western Surety received
a phone call from bona fide purchaser Selena Mata.").
Western Surety denied the claims of the auto auctions. But, then the auctions said
they would not release remaining vehicle titles until the checks and vehicles were paid. The
auctions told the bona fide purchasers to make claims upon the Western Surety bond which a
couple did and thereafter the auctions accepted payments from Western Surety and released
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titles
(Nick Hestead seriously questions whether the auctions had the right to withhold titles
because the auctions knew Best of the Best would sell the vehicles to bona fide purchasers for
value)

C.
NICK HESTEAD MADE A CLAIM
ON THE WESTERN SURETY BOND AND COMPLIED WITH THE
PROCEDURE IN IDAHO CODE 49-1610
Western Surety points out that 30 days after an order was entered by Judge Brad Ford,
Nick Hestead filed a claim through the Idaho Transportation Department based upon two
Orders that were entered. (R.Vol II 162-166) (Appellants Brief P 14 -15).
Hestead did in fact recognize that Idaho Code 49-1610 required a judgment stating in
the September 19, 2009 letter that this was the language in Idaho Code 49-1610 and detailing
that position. At the end of the letter Hesteads counsel stated "I believe the Order is the
equivalent of a Judgment under Idaho law." (R.Vol II p 174 last paragraph). With regard to
that statement it is important to note the amount of the claim was minimal - $877 .50 and
counsel thought that generally orders sometimes can be judgments, and quite frankly, not
much time was spent at this point. The Supreme Court has made the distinction very clear in
two recent cases. Spokane Structures Inc v Equitable Investment 148 Idaho 616. 226 P.3rd
1263 (2010); T.J.T. Inc v Mori 148 Idaho 825, 230 P.3d 425 (2010)

Nick Hestead

concedes that these orders are not "judgments".
The important fact to be gleaned from this discussion is that no claim was made on the
bond for the damage Nick Hestead claimed as a result of the deception by Best of the Best
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until Hestead obtained a judgment. And, the claim based upon the two orders for $877.50 was
made through the "custodian of the bond" the Idaho Transportation Department. (R. Vol 1 p
89 - ITD Letter, last paragraph)
After Judge Morfitt entered judgment, demand was made upon Western Surety for
payment under the bond.
Western Surety admitted in its Answer that

1. Demand has been made upon Best of the Best Auto Sales Inc for payment of the
judgment and no payment was made within 30 days. (R. Vol 1 p 11 - Answer Paragraph 14)
2. Plaintiff Nick Hestead made a sworn demand upon Western Surety within one (1)
year of the Judgment and after 30 days after the date of the Judgment. (R. Vol 1 p 12 Answer
Paragraph 17)
3. No person, entity or organization has obtained a Judgment against Best of the Best
Auto Sales Inc and made a claim upon the bond. (R. Vol 1 p .12 Answer Paragraph 19)
Western Surety denied that the Judgment is covered by the bond on the basis that the
"bond has been exhausted". (R.Vol 1 p.12 Answer Paragraph 16 & First Affirmative
Defense).
D.
THE IDAHO TRANSPORTATION DEPARTMENT TAKES NO
POSITION WITH REGARD TO THE PROCEDURE FOR PAYMENT
OF AUTO DEALER BOND CLAIMS
Daryl Marler has been Dealer Licensing Program Supervisor Daryl at the Idaho
Department of Transportation for 5 ½ years. (R. 75 Dep Marler P 4 L 17- 19). He directs
dealer licensing which involves licensing, auditing. monitoring. and enforcement upon all
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motor vehicle dealers, and he directs motor vehicle investigations.(R. 75 (Dep Marler P 5 L 920) He stated that there is a specific statute - Idaho Code 49-1610 and/or 49-1608 - that deals
with the conditions under which a dealers bond can be liable for a claim.( R. 75 Dep Marler P
6 Ll0-16). He at no time in the deposition referenced or was even asked about Idaho Code

41-1839. (R. 73-88.Dep Marler).
Mr.Marler's testimony was very clear that ITD has not taken a position regarding
whether Judgments are or are not required for bond payments. He testified:
Q. And does your department have a position on whether or not sureties can pay
claims made by consumers in Idaho on Lhe motor vehicle dealer bonds without
having a judgment?

A. To my knowledge we don't make any - any- any statements in regard to the
validity of the claim or anything else. Its just we send it in, and then its up
to the surety company and then the complainant.
(R.30 Dep Marler P 30 L 15-22)
Q Now does your department ever, in its interactions with sureties take
a position with the surety as to whether or not a particular claim ought
to be paid?

A.No
(R.83 Dep Marler P 38 L 24-25; P 39 L 1-3)
Q. Does your department have a manual, other than an employment manual?

A. We do have a dealer operations procedure manual.
Q. How many pages long is that?

A. It includes the manual for investigations and for dealer licensing and I'm
guessing it probably somewhere around - single sided sheets. I don't remember
how many pages it has, but its - covers a lot of issues.
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Q. Do you know, does it cover surety issues at all?
A. No
Q.Does it cover bond issues at all?
A. I don't think there's anything mentioned - under the dealer licensing part
there is about the requirement for the dealer bond and stuff like that, but
as far as handling bond claims and things like that, there's nothing I am
aware of.
(R.85 Marler Dep P45-46).

ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

1. Is Nick Hestead entitled to Attorneys Fees pursuant to Idaho Code 41-1839

2. Did the Trial Court commit error when it did not award the sales tax and interest paid
the lender as a "loss or damage" under Idaho Code 49-1610

ARGUMENT
1

THE WESTERN SURETY BOND IS A STATUTORY BOND
AND ITS ACTIONS MUST BE IN ACCORD WITH THE BOND
STATUTES. IT CANNOT REWRITE OR REVISE IDAHO LAW
The Western Surety bond is a statutory bond, not an insurance policy. As a statutory
bond it must follow the procedures in the statute, just as a claimant must do.
Bryant Motors v American States Insurance 118 Idaho 796, 800 P.2d 683 (Ct App
1990) discussed whether there is coverage of particular claims and persons under Idaho· s
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automobile bond statute. The case states general rules regarding the auto bond as follows:
"The obligation of a surety on a bond required by statute is determined by the
provisions of the statute. Royal Indemnity Co. of New York v Business
Factors Inc.96 Ariz 165, 393 P.2d 261 (1964). Thus such bonds are construed
in the light of the statute creating the obligations secured and of the purposes
for which the bond is required, as expressed in the statute. (citation omitted) ........ .
. . . . . .It is presumed that the intention of the parties was to execute a bond such
as the law required. 12 Am Jur 2d Bonds Section 26 at 495-96 (1964)
118 Idaho at 798
Bryant was cited with approval in a subsequent case. In Seubert Excavators v Eucon
~

125 Idaho 409 at 417, 871 P.2d 826 (1994) our Supreme Court said:
" Furthermore, it is a principle of Idaho law that the obligation of a surety on
a bond required by statute is determined by the obligations and purposes set
forth in the statute. Bryant Motors Inc v American States Inc 118 Idaho 796,
798, 800 P.2d 683, 685 ..... "
Idaho's law regarding an auto dealers bond includes two statutes: Idaho Code 49-1608

and Idaho Code 49-1610.

Idaho Code 49-1608 both at the time applicable in this case, and

now, require in pertinent part:
" Before any dealer's license shall be issued by the department to any applicant
the applicant shall procure and file with the department good and sufficient
bond in the amount shown, conditioned that the applicant shall not practice any
fraud, make any fraudulent representation or violate any of the provisions of
this chapter, rules of the department, or the provisions of chapter 5, title 49,
section 49-1418, or chapter 6, title 48, Idaho Code, or federal motor vehicle
safety standards, or odometer fraud in the conduct of the business for which he
is licensed. "
The next applicable section, Idaho Code 49-1610, refers to "Process"'. In pertinent
part it states:
"49-1610 . Right of action for loss by fraud - Process. - (1) If any person
shall suffer any loss or damage by reason of any fraud practiced on him or
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fraudulent representations made to him by a licensed dealer or one (1) of
the dealer's salesmen acting for the dealer, in his behalf or within the scope
of the employment of salesman, or shall suffer any loss or damage by reason
of the violation by the dealer or salesman of any of the provisions of this
chapter, or chapter 5, title 49, Idaho Code, or section 49-1418, Idaho Code
or chapter 6, title 48 Idaho Code, or any applicable rule or regulation of
the board, or federal odometer law or regulation, that person shall have a
right of action against the dealer and his salesman.
(2) ..... .
(3) ...... .

(4) Whenever any person is awarded a final judgment in a court of competent
jurisdiction in the state of Idaho for any loss or damage by reason of the
violation by such dealer or salesman of any of the provisions of this chapter,
chapter 5, title 49, section 49-1418, or chapter 6, title 48, Idaho Code, or any
rule or regulation of the department in connection with the purchase of a
vehicle, or federal motor vehicle safety standards, or in connection with the
purchase of a vehicle if the loss or damage is a result of odometer tampering
or odometer fraud, the judgment creditor may file a verified claim with the
corporate surety who has provided the dealer's surety bond, or with the
chairman of the dealer advisory board where the dealer has deposited with the
director a cash bond or certificate of deposit.
(a) The claim shall be filed no sooner than thirty(30) days and no later
than one (1) year after the judgment has become final.
(b) The claim shall:
(1) Be accompanied by a certified copy of the judgment
(2) State the amount of the claim if different from the judgment amount
and
(3) State that demand has been made upon the dealer for payment of the
Judgment, and the dealer has failed to pay the judgment in full within
thirty (30) days.
LC. 49-1610 is not ambiguous. Its title is "Process". Subdivision 4 seems
straightforward, and nowhere in Western Surety's 43 page brief does Western Surety
claim it is ambiguous. Subsection (4) (a) mandates that the claim "shall be filed no
sooner than thirty (30) days and no later than one (1) year after the judgment has become
final". The Supreme Court has held that "shall" when used in a statute imposes a
mandatory obligation. (Mendenhall v Aldous 146 Idaho 434 at 438 note 4 (2008).
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Subsection (4) uses the word "Judgment" four times, as stated by Trial Court Judge Susan
Wiebe in her bench decision. (Transcript P 19) . It consistently uses the term "shall".
Thus, Nick Hestead does not understand how Western Surety can say that a claim can
be filed anytime, and paid any time when subsection (4)(a) states it can't be.
Nick Hestead followed the statutory process for making a claim on Best of the Best
Auto Sales Inc's bond. (R.Vol 1 p 12 Answer Paragraph 17).

No other purported claimant

has ever done so. Hestead has obtained a judgment that clearly states that violations of Idaho
Code 49-1610 have occurred and that judgment has been presented in accordance with the
judgment claims procedure. (R.Vol 1 p 29-30)
Western Surety cannot unilaterally rewrite this statute, and claim that the "Process"
means nothing. Western Surety is simply writing this procedure out of the Idaho Code.
Section 4 of Idaho Code 49-1610 becomes meaningless and mere surplusage if a surety can
pay any claim that comes into its offices without regard as to whether there is a judgment. As
our Supreme Court has stated:
"If possible, it is incumbent upon a court to give a statute an interpretation
which will not in effect nullify it" (DeRouse v Higgensen 95 Idaho 173,176)

In Dohl v PSF Industries Inc 899 P.2d 445, 127 Idaho 232 (1995) our Supreme Court
said:
"Statutes are to be construed to ascertain and give effect to the purpose of
the legislation and to give force and effect to every part of the provision.
(Citation omitted) ....

We wiJJ not presume that the legislature performed the idle act of enacting
a superfluous statute."
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A.
THE JUDGMENT REQUIREMENT IS A RESULT OF A LEGISLATIVE DECISION
BASED UPON COMPETING ARGUMENTS AND POLICIES AND LEGISLATURES
AROUND THE COUNTRY REQUIRE JUDGMENTS
There is no constitutional, common law, or extrinsic rule that requires that a legislature
set up an automobile dealer bond. system. The decision to do so, and the parameters of
claims and payments have been set up by legislatures around the country after considering
many arguments and suggestions, including those advanced. by Western Surety in
its brief. Our Legislature has chosen Idaho Code 49-1610, which requires judgments.
Some other states allow a direct action (Washington - RCWA 46. 70.070), many require
judgments (infra), some require execution upon judgments before filing a claim (infra), and
some provide for administrative resolution of judgments. (infra).
Western Surety expresses a dislike for our Idaho system. It claims in its brief that
Plaintiff position would lead to "absurb, and unreasonably harsh results." (App Br 35). It
claims · Claimants would be forced to wait until the statute of limitations had run ... " (App Br
36).
On the other hand, one very good reason is that a Judgment provides certainty that the
claim is valid. This serves the creditor, dealer and the bond company. The bond company
can pursue its claim for indemnification and the dealer cannot claim the bond company
improperly paid the claim. The bond company is exonerated from any bad faith or other claim
by its principal or guarantor or creditor. The dealer is secure knowing the bond company
won't pay a claim with which the dealer disagrees. Yet, the creditor knows the claim will still
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be paid if the creditor prevails.
And a Judgment is a public record, giving notice to others of the a potential bond
claim.
In addition, a dealer who defends a claim in Court incurs attorneys fees and expense
and knows the bond is in the wings, all of which should promote settlement in the smaller
cases that are typical of vehicle disputes. Small Claims Court is available for many of the
disputes that typically arise between a dealer and its customers.
A surety shouldn't be able to pick and choose who will be paid ..
But regardless of how Nick Hestead or Western Surety feels, the determination
has been made by the Legislature.

B.
MANY STATES REQUIRE A JUDGMENT AGAINST THE
AUTO DEALER FOR A BOND CLAIM TO BE PAID
Missouri requires a judgment. Western Surety even litigated a reported interpleader
case in connection with this Missouri statute. (Western Surety Company v Intrust Bank 20
S. W.3d 566 (Mo App W.D.2000) stating at 570 that "Considering the language of Section
301.588.1(4) it is significant that the triggering event for payment of the proceeds of the
bond is the receipt of a final judgment." (Emphasis added)

Colorado requires a judgment before an auto dealer bond must make payment and
Western Surety has litigated a case there concerning whether an unpaid Judgment was entirely
covered by the bond. (Edmonds v Western Surety 962 P.2d 323 (Colo App 1998)
The Judgment requirement is widely used throughout the United States. Some states

- 15 -

have even more restrictive procedures. Here are some examples:
Alabama - A claim may be made after a judgment is entered against the principal
(dealer) by filing the Judgment with an administrative body. (Ala Adrnin Code 810-8--509)
(3) (4). Alabama even requires that the judgment creditor try to collect from other sources
before filing the claim.
Indiana - Ind.Code 9-23-2-2(e) requires a $25,000 bond to cover fines and penalties
and to secure the "payment of damages to a person aggrieved by a violation of this chapter by
the licensee after a judgment has been obtained."
Kansas - Requires a final judgment be presented to the Director who then makes an
administrative determination as to whether the Judgment should be paid from the Bond.
(K.S.A. 8-2404)

Montana - Montana requires that a person who suffers loss or damage ....... "shall
obtain a judgment from a court of competent jurisdiction prior to collecting on the bond of the
dealer broker, wholesaler, or auto auction .. , ...... (MCA 61- 4- 126) (1) & (2)
C.
THREE JURISDICTIONS HA VE REQUIRED COMPLIANCE
WITH AN AUTO DEALER BOND CLAIM PROCEDURE

Arkansas requires a Judgment and then requires that the Judgment be presented to the
Department of Financing Administration before a lawsuit can be brought against a surety.
Hankins v McElroy dba Mac·s Auto Sales, and Lawyers Surety Corporation 313 Ark 394.
855 S.W. 2d 310) (1993). The Arkansas Supreme Court stated:
"Section 23-112-603 further provides that: the proceeds of the
bond shall be paid upon receipt by the Director of the Department
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of Finance and Administration of a final judgment from an Arkansas
Court of competent jurisdiction against the principal and in favor
of an aggrieved party .
. . . . . . "The record does not show the appellant availed himself of
this administrative remedy. Instead of presenting his judgment to
the Director of DF & A, appellant sought declaratory relief in the
circuit court."
.... "Clearly this is a procedure the legislature intended to be
followed when it delegated regulatory jurisdiction of used motor
vehicle dealers to DF & A ...... "
(855 S.W.2d at 312)
Nevada requires a Judgment prior to making a claim on a cash auto dealer bond, or
payment by the Director after review. After obtaining a Judgment the claimant is required to
present its claim to the Director of the Department of Motor Vehicles for payment. The
judgment is binding upon the surety or cash bond. (N.R.S. 482-345)
State of Nevada Department of Motor Vehicles v Garcia Mendoza 114 Nev 1187, 971
P.2d 377 (1998) held that this procedure must be followed in order to have a valid claim.
In Footnote 1 at 971 P.2d, at 379, the Supreme Court of Nevada stated:
"The Honorable Justice Rose argues, in dissent, that the
DMV had priority over Garcia-Mendoza because the DMV
has a prior right of set-off and its claim was prior in time.
This is not the case for two reasons: First, although it is
true that the DMV had an earlier claim against the dealer,
the DMV did not have an earlier claim against the bond.
In fact, the DMV has never made a proper claim against
the bond, because as discussed below, the DMV did not
attempt to follow the statutory procedures specifically
set forth for making such a claim. Instead, in an exercise
of power unsupported by authority, the DMV simply
helped itself to the money. Second, the DMV's common
law right to set-off cannot take precedence over its statutory
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duty to pay out on the bond in the manner established by
the legislature. In this case, Garcia-Mendoza followed the
statutory procedures for executing upon the bond; the DMV
did not. In short, Garcia Mendoza perfected her claim first
and is entitled to priority to the money."
In Frank et al v Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company 136 Misc 186, 239 N.Y.S.
397, (1930) the Supreme Court of New York County said:
"The questions presented for determination thus relate to said payments
by the defendant, aggregating $4,001.50. When paying the fund into
the Court, is the defendant entitled to deduct such amount from the limit
of $10,000 fixed in the policy on all judgments recovered upon claims
arising out of the same transaction for bodily injuries or death. Considering
first the payments in settlement of claims of $3,383.50: The provision as
to the limit of insurance on all judgments was inserted in the policy pursuant
to the statute for the protection of judgment creditors. It is specifically in the
language required by the statute, and as such limitation applies only to
judgments, any other liability under the policy is not affected by such
limitation. When the insurer paid the claims on which no judgments had
been obtained, it did so voluntarily, without regard to the limitation, which
provides only for judgments, and it took the chance of being required to
thereafter pay out the full limitation of $10,000 upon judgments .....
239 N. Y.S. 402
The results of these cases make sense. A surety bond is not insurance. It is an
obligation based upon statutory parameters. Coverage and the process for claims can be
changed, expanded or contracted as the legislature wishes.
D.
THE SURETY BOND IS NOT EXHAUSTED
UNTIL PAYMENTS ARE MADE IN ACCORD
WITH THE STATUTE
The Frank case holds that payments not made upon judgments are not to be credited
to the obligation of the surety. Admittedly this is an old case that has not been cited, but it
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appears to be the closest case on point.
The State of Nevada case seems to imply this same result wherein it directs the Nevada
DMV to pay the cash bond claim to the perfected claimant, despite the fact that the bond

money had been paid to itself at an earlier date.
Western Surety in its brief and before, criticizes the "volunteer" language in the Frank
case as in conflict with Idaho Code 41-1839, but actually the "involuntary" language in
41-1839 helps Western Surety because it may be able to recoup its payments to the two
auctions.
2.
IDAHO CODE 41-1839 CAN BE READ
AND RECONCILED WITH IDAHO CODE
49-1610 SO THAT BOTH STATUTES
ARE EFFECTIVE AND IN FORCE
In State Dept of Health and Welfare v Housel 140 Idaho 96, 104, 90 P.3d 321 (2004)
our Supreme Court said the following with regard to statutory interpretation:
"It is the duty of courts, in construing statutes, to harmonize and
reconcile laws whenever possible and to adopt the construction of
statutory provisions which harmonize and reconciles them with other
statutory provisions."

Idaho Code 41-1839 is an attorneys fee statute. That is what the title says and that is
how it reads.
Idaho Code 49-1610 can be read with this provision.

Since Idaho Code 49-1610

requires a Judgment and provides for certain cutoffs for filing them as "claims"with the
surety, the reference to a "claim" in Idaho Code 41-1839 when addressing auto dealer bond
claims, refers to those that comply with Idaho Code 49-1610.
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For example, if an auto dealer bond claim not reduced to judgment was presented to
the surety and then a lawsuit filed after 60 days had passed, the Surety would presumably not
be liable for attorneys fees and the lawsuit would be dismissed.
If a claim based upon a judgment was presented to the surety and the surety refused to

pay within 60 days, then presumably the surety would be liable for the amount of the judgment
and attorneys fees under Idaho Code 41-1839 if the claimant prevailed.
Obviously, a "claim" not reduced to judgment might be valid under different bond
claims (fidelity, performance, or others) because many don't have the '"judgment''requirement
of Idaho Code 49-1610. Appellant Western Surety's brief discusses for example US Fidelity
and Guarantee v Clover Creek 92 Idaho 889. 452 P.2d 993 (1969) but it does not deal with an
express statutory bond or a judgment requirement.

A.
THE SENTENCE RELIED UPON
IN 41-1839 Subsection 3 SUPPLEMENTS
IDAHO CODE 49-1610 AND PROBABLY ALLOWS
WESTERN SURETY TO RECOVER ITS PAYMENTS FROM THE AUCTIONS
Western Surety emphasizes one sentence in the middle of subsection 3 of the Idaho
Code 41-1839 which they essentially say overrules and nullifies Idaho Code 49-1610.
Appellant Western Surety has seriously misinterpreted the applicable sentence in
subpart 3 and its effect.
The sentence states:
... "The surety shall be authorized to determine what portion or amount of
such claim is justly due the creditor or claimant and payment or tender of
the amount so determined by the surety shall not be deemed a volunteer
payment and shall not prejudice any right of the surety to indemnification
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and/or subrogation so long as such determination and payment by the surety
be made in good faith."
First there must be a proper "claim''. Idaho Code 41-1839 doesn·t define the process
for a claim on the auto dealer bond. Idaho Code 49-1610 does.
Next, if it determines that the "claim" is due, and makes a payment, the payment is

not a "volunteer" payment.

What does that mean?

Idaho Case law has defined payments which are made as a "volunteer" or "voluntary"
and explained what is meant by those terms.
In Quintana v Quintana 119 Idaho 1, 802 P.2d 488 (1990) the Idaho Court of Appeals
said that a personal representative that paid Federal Estate Taxes did not pay them as a
"volunteer" so the personal representative was able to recover a proportionate payment from
one of the heirs.

This was because the personal representative was obligated by law to

determine the tax liability and pay it.
In Shea v Owyhee County 66 Idaho 159, 156 P.2d 331 (1945) the Supreme Court held
that certain taxes were required to be paid, and therefor~ they were not "voluntary payments"
and applications for refunds could be made when new facts indicated some of the tax payments
were excessive.
Thus surety payments are "involuntary" and all this means is that the surety can
recover its payments through subrogation, indemnity from the principal, or even when
wrongfully made to a claimant. It means that Western Surety can recover its improper
payments from the auto auctions - and that is the course it should be pursuing, not an appeal of
Nick Hestead' s proper claim.
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A good example and discussion of "volunteer" is found in Mobile Telecommunication
v Aetna Casualty 962 F Supp 952 (E.D. Miss) wherein Aetna paid one million dollars on a
claim and later became entitled to its money back. The Court reviewed Mississippi law.
stating it is in accord with the general law on the subject, and concluded that the payment was
made as a "volunteer" and that absent an agreement with the insured, or a mistake of fact, or
fraud, Aetna couldn't recoup its payment.
Idaho Code 41-1839 (3) provides for the opposite result. The purpose of this sentence
is to allow the Surety to recover its money if an improper payment is made, or to recover a
payment from its principal, so long as the Surety is acting in good faith.

These sentences are

addressing "recovery" of money paid, not a claims process.
For example, if the surety paid $5000 on a claim, and the claimant decided to litigate
against the surety and recovered nothing, the surety could demand that the claimant refund the
$5000 payment it advanced.

If the surety paid a Judgment under Idaho Code 49-1610, and

the Judgment was later vacated because of an irregularity, the surety could recover its
payment. In addition, since payments under Idaho Code 41-1839 are not as a "volunteer"
a principal has difficulty refusing indemnification.
Going one step further, therefore, if the surety ignores Idaho Code 49-1610 and pays
"claims" not reduced to a judgment, the surety can recover those payments to the two auto
auction payments providing it can show it acted in good faith. Western Surety is in fact not
subject to paying more than $20,000. It can recoup the "involuntary" payments it has
erroneously made to the auto auctions.
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3.
GOOD FAITH IS ONLY APPLICABLE TO WHETHER
WESTERN SURETY CAN RECOVER ITS PAYMENT
Appellants brief misstates Nick Hesteads position regarding "Good Faith". His
position is that good faith is not a legal defense to compliance with Idaho Code 49--1610,
because legally there is no auto auction claim for Western Surety to pay because there simply
is no judgment. So how can there be any "good faith" and not abide by the law?
"Good Faith" It is a standard by which the conduct of the surety is measured to
determine whether the surety can recoup its payment from a wrongfully paid claimant, recover
through indemnity, or recover through subrogation. It doesn't absolve Western Surety from
complying with the statute. It does give Western Surety the right to recover its money as an
"involuntary payor."
Western Surety is quite wrong when it says that Nick Hestead concedes there is good
faith. Nick Hestead never asserted "bad faith" because Western Surety never claimed good
faith applied to Idaho Code 49-1610, until it filed its Memorandum in Opposition to the
Motion for Summary Judgment in November, 2010. Plaintiffs counsel sent several letters to
Western Surety asking for reasons why Western Surety did not need to conform to Idaho Code
49-1610. No response talked about "good faith".

1
Westem Surety's lack of good faith is demonstrated by:
Assistant Vice President Michael Dow in his letter where he presents the Judgment requirement (R. Vol II.32-33) ..
Western Surety paid one bounced check and a second check plus around $2000. Nick Hestead is nor ready to concede that the
auctions had the right to withhold titles from bona fide purchasers.
Western Surety is well aware of the imerpleader remedy.
There is no evidence that Western Surety made even a cursory attempt to determine if there were other claimants
Western Surety as llil involuntary payor should have tried to recoup its money .
It is not dear that the Dealers Auro Auction check was a transaction with the corporation, instead of Ron Zechman
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4.
WESTERN SURETY CAN USE THE EQUITABLE INTERPLEADER
REMEDY WHICH ELIMINATES THE NEED FOR JUDGMENTS
Aside from the law. a policy problem with Western Surety of ignoring the Judgment
requirement and paying "claims" not reduced to judgments and sent directly to it by two auto
auctions, is that legitimate claimants are left out of the process.
This can be solved by a proper interpleader that makes a reasonable attempt to give
notice to all potential existing claimants. Some notice is necessary because those who read
Idaho Code 49-1610 are led to believe that claims cannot be filed until 30 days after the
judgment has been entered and a demand made upon the dealer. Unperfected claimants, are
certainly left with the impression that a claim of any kind cannot be made until that event has
occurred. Therefore, if Western Surety wants to discharge its liability "early" it needs to
make a reasonable effort to contact all potential claimants and then use the interpleader
remedy.
Interpleader can solve Western Surety's dilemma and Western Surety is well aware of
it. Western Surety's counsel acknowledged this in his statement to the trial court:
" ..... Nobody disputes that there is an interpleader statute
in the rule, and that seems to be the reason why counsel
wanted to get the pleading in front of the court, which is
to say, here's another case where Western Surety used
an interpleader action. Nobody disputes the rule."
(Transcript p. 4, Ll 8-15)
In fact Interpleader has been used by sureties in Idaho for almost a hundred years.

(American Surety Co of New York v Mills 232 F.841 C.C.A Idaho (1916) (holding this
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equitable remedy may be used, but no creditor should be preferred over another under the
circumstances of the case).
The record shows that the remedy was used for auto bonds in the Tytan Motors and
Boise Auto Brokers cases in 2000 and 2001. (R Vol II p 176 - offered into evidence by
Western Surety).
Western Surety used this remedy in the reported case of Western Surety Company v
Intrust Bank 20 S. W.3d 566 (Mo App W.D.2000)
Claims Manager Thomas Snyder acknowledged the interpleader remedy in his April
19, 2010 letter wherein he stated" An interpleader action does get filed in cases were (sic)
there is more than one claim at the same time and the total amount of those claims is in excess
of the penal sum." (R.Vol II p 187)
Thus, Western Surety can include perfected claims Gudgments) and potential claims at
one time, tender the amount of its bond, and close the file upon bonds which have no
reasonable likelihood of indemnification from the principal and for which the claims are well
in excess of $20,000.
And Interpleader notice is now even easier. ITD Dealer Licensing Supervisor Daryl
Marler testified that he could easily get on the computer and pull up every complaint on a
dealer that has been entered. (R 81 Marler Dep P 30 L 4-8).

5.
NICK HESTEAD REQUESTS
ATTORNEYS FEES ON APPEAL
Nick Hestead requests attorneys fees on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code 41-1839 (1), (4)
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and IAR 41
According to Appellants memorandum this section is applicable to attorneys fees
a wards because this section and 12-123 are the exclusive remedies for obtaining attorneys fees
in disputes arising out of insurance policies citing Mortensen v Stewart Title 149 Idaho 437,
447, 235 P,3d 387, 389 (2010), They claim Idaho Code 41-1839 applies,
Nick Hestead asks for attorneys fees pursuant to 41-1839 (1) (3) (4) as an
intended,beneficiary under the bond, Hestead notes Smith v Great Basin Grain 98 Idaho 266,
281-282 (1977) which allowed a claimant to recover attorneys from a surety pursuant to this
section. If Idaho Code 41-1839 does not apply then

RESPONDENTS CROSS APPEAL
1.

PLAINTIFF/RESPONDENTS CONTEND THE
DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN NOT AWARDING
THE SALES TAX AND LOAN INTEREST DAMAGE
Idaho Code 49-1610 provides that the bond will cover any ''loss or damage" contained
in the judgment. Trial Judge Susan Wiebe did not award damage claims for $750 in sales
taxes paid, and $3729 in interest. (Tr. p 20).

These items were awarded in Judge Morfitts

judgment issued against Best of the Best Auto Sales Inc. Specifically the Judgment said:
"And the COURT FINDS that the Plaintiff has been damaged as
a result of these violations in the amount of $12,500 plus interest
at the rate of 10.9% since June 8, 2007, in the amount of $3729
and sales tax damage of $750"
(R.Vol 1 p 29 Judgment - last paragraph)
The original complaint filed in Hestead v Best of the Best Auto Sales Inc, and made a
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part of the record by Western Surety, stated in Paragraph VI and XI
"As a result of this breach, Plaintiff has been damaged in the
amount of $12,500 in that the value of the vehicle is ½ of the
value of an unbranded vehicle of good used quality plus
a refund of sales tax in the amount of $750 plus interest
Plaintiff paid on borrowed funds which he incurred in regard
to the amount of $12,500 as proven at trial."
(R.Vol IP 109 - Complaint Paragraph VI & XI)
Neither Western Surety nor Best of the Best ever challenged this Judgment by post trial
motions of any kind, or by any collateral challenge. There is no question that Western Surety
has had notice after notice of this judgment, and knew about the litigation prior to judgment.
The Judgment was not appealed.

Therefore, the finding by Judge Morfitt that these two items

are damages is binding and final.
In any event the term "damage" includes this interest and sales tax damage.
In Taylor v Neill 80 Idaho 90. at 94, 325 P.d 391 (1958) our Supreme Court stated
that '"Damages' is a broad term and includes special as well as general damage."
The amount of $750 is 6% of $12,500, and thus represents the amount of sales tax
Nick Hestead was charged on money deceptively obtained by Best of the Best. Nick Hestead
was in fact charged sales tax. (R.Vol 1 p 112 - "Tax Collected - $1500.00). Certainly,
Hestead should not pay sales tax on an amount that he does not owe and which Judge Morfitt
found he should never have paid.
Hestead also financed the purchase of this truck with his credit union. (R.Vol 1 p 101
- Dep Hestead P 12 L 10-11). In fact he will be paying on this loan until October 25, 2015.
(R. Vol I p 104 Dep Hestead P 27 L 3-4)
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The Idaho Court of Appeals has determined that loan interest can be a "damage"
In Spreader Specialists v Monroe Inc 114 Idaho 15 at 21 752 P.2d 617 (1988) the Court said:
"Idaho's appellate courts have never considered the precise
question. Few courts have. However, the courts that have
broached this topic seem to agree that amounts actually
paid as interest on a loan obtained to remedy harm caused
by wrongful conduct - such as breach of contract or tortious
acts - are not prejudgment interest They are elements of
consequential damages." (Cit om)

Accordingly, we hold that interest charges incurred on a
loan obtained in good faith, as part of a reasonable course
of action to mitigate losses, may be recovered as an item
of consequential damages. See generally Farmers Insurance
Company of Arizona v R.B.L Investment Company 138 Ariz
562,675 P.2d 1381 (Ct App 1983); Vining v Smith 213 Miss
850, 58 So.2d 34 (1952)
In our case, Nick Hestead borrowed money from his credit union to pay for the truck,
and had to pay interest on the $12,500 value that he overpaid for the truck because of the
misrepresentation by Best of the Best Auto Sales Inc. Hestead had no choice but to continue
making payments on money that was taken from him by the deception of Best of the Best. His
only alternative was to quit making payments, which would of course, result in a repossession.

CONCLUSION
The Judgment of the Trial Court should be affirmed except that the amount of the sales
tax and the interest should be awarded as a matter of law. so that Nick Hestead should have
a total judgment of $16,979.00. Nick Hestead should also be awarded his reasonable attorneys
fees concerning this appeal.
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